This paper describes the sale and optimal regulation of a sequence of public utilities, where monitoring of regulatory compliance is costly. The government is concerned with the revenue raised by successive privatizations as well as the standard objective of e¢ciency in production. The costs of monitoring are private information to the government. At each stage in the sequence of privatizations the public Bayes updates it's distribution of posterior beliefs over the governments regulatory enforcement strategy. The government knows that this "learning" is taking place and chooses the time path of monitoring levels accordingly.
Introduction.
In recent years national governments in many countries around the world have chosen to privatize and then regulate their public utilities. Governments …nd this attractive for (at least) two reasons. First, the privatized utilities are assumed to be more e¢cient than their public counterparts 1 . Second, governments …nd the revenues raised by selling the utilities to be useful for a number of political reasons. However, the privatization of public utilities also involves costs. The privatized …rms often enjoy a signi…cant degree of market power enabling them to potentially appropriate rents and thus make supernormal pro…ts. This presents governments with a fundamental dilemma. If they choose to regulate the utilities, and then monitor them to enforce compliance with the regulations, they can ensure that at least some of the e¢ciency gains bene…t consumers. However, greater monitoring reduces the level of monopoly pro…ts that may be earned, this in turn reduces the prices at which the government may sell the utilities. Our paper is about how the government solves this problem for a sequence of privatizations.
We shall examine the case where there is asymmetric information. At the outset of the sequence of privatizations the true costs of monitoring are private information to the government (information obtained in prior periods when its agents had administered the utilities). The public, who purchase the utilities, cannot observe, and do not know, the true costs of monitoring. They must therefore make inferences about monitoring costs from observations on post privatization pro…ts. In choosing the level of monitoring in each period the government is aware of the inferences that the public will make and the implications this has for the sale price of future privatizations. In this sense the government has an incentive to monitor strategically.
While stylized, the model we develop explains well several of the features observed in real world privatization process'. Consistent with observation our model predicts that monitoring and thus the level of e¤ective regulation will rise over time. Initial pro…ts for privatized utilities will start high but ultimately fall as monitoring increases. Initial equity o¤erings in the privatized utilities may be sold at a signi…cant discount but will then rise rapidly in value before converging to their long run equilibrium levels. 1 See Donahue [4] for a survey of evidence from the US that indicates that private …rms are more pro…table than their public counterparts, while Mueller [15] and Vining and Boardman [22] supply some international evidence to the same e¤ect. Kikeri et al [11] and Meggison [14] present evidence that privatization increases e¢ciency.
In the next section we analyze the privatization of a sequence of public utilities. We start with a simple static model of optimal monitoring where one single utility has been privatized. We then extend our analysis to the case where the government sells a sequence of utilities and monitors them strategically. In section 3 we discuss the models potential implications for explaining why public utilities are privatized. In section 4 of the paper, we present a brief discussion of an alternative interpretation of our model in which it is government preferences rather than monitoring costs that are private information. In section 5 we present a short case study of a privatized utility by summarizing the events surrounding the 1989 privatization of the water utility in the UK. Section 6 provides a brief conclusion and suggestions for further research. All proofs of propositions will be relegated to the appendix.
A Model of the Privatization Process.
Consider a government that owns I identical public utilities, each of which possesses some degree of natural market power. However, due to either incentive or institutional problems (unionization etc.) the utilities do not operate at minimum cost. 2 Consequently, to promote e¢ciency, and for revenue raising reasons, the government decides to sell these utilities to the private sector 3 . Once privatized the pro…t motive provides the incentives for the 2 Boyko, Shleifer and Vishny [3] suggest that politicians have preferences over both pro…t and employment which leads to a desire for ine¢ciently high employment. They argue that it is easier for politicians to divert pro…t into employment in state run industries than it is for them to provide employment supporting subsidies to private enterprise. Thus in certain circumstances the politicians will only induce excess employment if …rms are state controlled. It follows that an e¢cency concerned "reformer" will choose privatization.
Hart, Shleifer and Vishny [8] argue that privatized …rms may be more pro…table than their publicly owned counterparts because of the incompleteness of contracts. For example it may not be possible to perfectly specify quality in a contract. The privatized utility may earn greater pro…ts by sacri…cing quality. Whether e¢ciency is enhanced is an open question. 3 The revenue raising motive for utility sales is controversial Vickers and Yarrow [21] argue that the government could raise revenue by borrowing against the future returns from the industry. Similarly Mansoor [13] argues that if the utility is sold competitively the …scal impact of the sale should be idenical to issuing debt. Given that utilities are often sold at signi…cant discounts this would seem to undermine the rationale for privatization. Following Boyko et al [3] and Haskel and Sanchis [9] we argue that there are e¢ciency utilities to both minimize cost and exploit their market power. The government desires cost minimization, but wishes to regulate the exploitation of market power. To this end the government regulates the privatized utilities and enforces compliance with these regulations. Monitoring compliance with the regulatory regime is costly, so that typically neither monitoring nor compliance will be perfect.
Rather than launch directly into a full analysis of a sequence of privatizations, we build our analysis in stages, starting with the problem of the optimal monitoring of a single …rm, this serves both to develop intuition and …x notation for this somewhat convoluted problem.
2.1
The Optimal Monitoring of a Single Firm.
The Firms Optimization Problem.
Suppose that a single …rm has been privatized. It is assumed to maximize pro…ts subject to the degree of e¤ective regulation that it faces. The …rm possess' a stochastic net pro…t function of the following form
where P (C t ) is the …rms gross pro…t function, C t is the level of compliance at time t to an existing regulatory regime. T (C t ; m t ) is a penalty function that represents the expected …nes associated with non-compliance to a given regulatory regime. m t is the intensity with which compliance to the regulatory regime is monitored. We assume A1 C t 2 [0; 1], where C t = 0 represents zero compliance and C t = 1 full compliance.
A2 P C < 0; P CC < 0 the …rms gross pro…t function is a decreasing strictly convex function of, C t :
gains from privatization. These e¢ceincy gains make the utilities more pro…table under private than public ownership, and thus make the sale value of the utilities potentially higher than their value as a public asset against which the goverment may borrow. It might also be noted that in some circumstances governments do choose privatize rather than to issue debt (Kikeri et al [11] report that there have been 6800 privatizations worldwide since 1980). Presumably rational governments would not choose this method if to issue debt were superior. A3 P (1) = M in C P (C) = 0 so full compliance eliminates all super-normal pro…ts.
A4 P (0) = Max C P (C) zero compliance is (gross) pro…t maximizing.
A5 T (C t ; m t ) = r(m t )k(C t ) where r(m) is the probability that non-compliance will be detected for a given monitoring intensity m t , and k(C t ) is the …ne associated with non-compliance.
A6 r m (m t ) > 0, and r mm = 0:
These assumptions on k(C t ) and r(m t ) imply that T C (C t ; m t ) < 0,
To ensure that the …rms optimal level of compliance is an interior solution, and that it's responses to changes in monitoring intensity may be represented by a continuous di¤erentiable reaction function, we further assume A8 T C (C; m) ! 0 as C ! 1;, for any 0 · m t · 1 and T C (C; m) ! 1 as C ! 0, for any 0 · m t · 1.
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Finally to allow us to obtain sharp closed form solutions we make the following distributional assumptions. 4 It is not clear whether r(m) should be convex or concave. The notion that at low levels of monitoring the detection of non-compliance is easily avoided suggests that r(m) should be convex. Alternatively the idea of diminishing returns to monitoring activity suggests r(m) should be concave. We assume that the function is not "too curved" and adopt linearity as a reasonable approximation. 5 The parameters of the …ne function k(C) are assumed …xed. In principle the …ne function k(C), could also be a decision variable. It might seem that the government could ensure full compliance by selecting in…nitely large …nes. There are problems with this argument. The liability of …rms is bounded below by bankrupcy laws, so an in…nity …ne cannot actualy be levied. Further, even if an in…nite …ne were feasible, it would almost certainly not be optimal if there was any possibility that a …rm could be mistakenly adjudged to have engaged in non-compliance. For these reason we regard a …xed …ne function as a good working assumption. 6 We assume that the governments is able to commit to the chosen level of monitoring, so there is no "Inspection Game" as for example in Fudenberg and Tirole [5] p17.
A9 " t is a random variable distributed " t » N (0; 1) i.e. with zero mean and unit variance 7 .
To solve the …rms optimization problem we di¤erentiate (1) with respect to C t yielding the …rst order condition
the optimal level of compliance is thus a function of the level of monitoring C t = C(m t ) 8 We can now characterize the e¤ects of changes in m t on the …rms level of compliance and expected pro…ts.
Lemma 1
Compliance is an increasing concave function of monitoring,
When the …rm is faced with a higher level of monitoring this raises the probability that non-compliance to the regulatory regime will be detected, and thus the expected marginal cost of non-compliance. The …rm's expected pro…ts decline for two reasons. First, for any given level of compliance increased monitoring implies that it will face higher expected …nes. Second, from lemma 1 we know that the …rms optimal response to increased monitoring intensity is to increase it's level of compliance, but this itself reduces the …rms gross pro…ts 7 Our conclusions do not depend upon these assumptions which are made purely for expositional purposes. 8 Our earlier assumptions on the functions P (:) and T (:) are su¢cient for a unique solution in C t .
Lemma 2 Expected pro…ts
¦ t (m t )´P (C t ) ¡ T (C t ; m t ),
The Governments Optimization Problem.
In the case of the optimal monitoring of a single …rm the objective of the government is to improve e¢ciency via regulation given that the monitoring of regulatory compliance is costly 9 . Speci…cally we assume the governments preferences are given by
E(C t ) is the overall e¢ciency (as measured by consumer surplus). The greater the compliance, the greater the bene…ts to the government, E C (C t ) > 0, but at a diminishing rate: E CC · 0 with E C (0) = 1 and E C (1) = 0. H(m) is the cost of monitoring with H m > 0, H mm > 0 and H m (0) = 0, H m (1) = 1. When the government chooses the level of monitoring it is assumed to know the …rms reaction function C(m t ). Maximizing (3) subject to the …rm's reaction function and de…ning F (m t ) = E(C(m t )) ¡ H(m t ) yields the following
The solution to this …rst order condition, m ¤ t , de…nes optimal monitoring in the single …rm problem. 10 .
Remark 1
The optimum monitoring level, m ¤ , is constrained socially optimal in the sense that it maximizes e¢ciency subject to the monitoring cost function. Of course this is not the …rst best solution which would only be achieved if monitoring was costless so that the highest e¢ciency (C = 1) is attained. In the next section, in which we introduce the dynamic problem, deviations from m ¤ are a measure of the social costs of the governments revenue raising activities. 9 We have chosen to model this problem as a monitoring problem in the spirit of Greenwald [6] , Baron and Besanko [?] and Price [18] , rather than as a principal agent problem of the Baron and Myerson [2] , Sappington [19] [20] or La¤ont and Tirole [12] type. We chose this approach because regulation and monitoring is the primary mechanism by which most real world privatizations are controlled. 10 The second order condition is satis…ed since
Optimal Monitoring with a Sequence of
Privatizations.
In the preceding section we examined the optimal monitoring of a single privatized utility. Here we assume that the government privatizes and then monitors a sequence of I utilities, where a single utility is sold to the public in each of the …rst t = 1; 2; ::; I periods and is then regulated and monitored optimally 11 . The exact timing of events is as follows. At the beginning of any period t · I the public hold beliefs about the value the utility to be sold in that period. The government then sells the utility at the price given by the publics valuation, it then chooses a common monitoring level for all privatized …rms. Each …rm then chooses a (identical) level of compliance. Given the levels of monitoring and compliance privatized …rms then earn pro…ts which are publicly observable at the end of the period. On the basis of the new information contained in the observations on pro…ts the public update their beliefs about the value of the next utility to be sold. This sequence of events is illustrated in …gure 1.
Public hold prior beliefs about the vlaue of public utilities.
Government sells a utility.
Government sets the intensity of monitoring.
Profits from all privatized utilities are observed.
Public update their beliefs based on observed profits.
Beginning of period t.
End of period t.
The Sequence of Events in Period t.
The sale of utilities yields revenue for the government, to recognize this 11 Hereafter we adopt the following conventions when using indecies; t denotes the current period, k is an index across …rms at any given time t, j is the index for a variable that is lagged backwards, and i is the index for a variable that is lagged forwards (typically an expectation).
we rewrite the governments objective function as
this expression di¤ers from equation (3) in two important regards; (i) S t is the discounted sum of the expected revenues from remaining future privatiza-
e¢ciency gains net of the total cost of monitoring over all current and future privatizations. If, as we shall argue below, expected future privatization revenues are e¤ected by the preceding levels of government monitoring, then the optimal level of monitoring will vary systematically over the sequence of privatizations. Di¤erentiating (5) w.r.t. m t provides
we may immediately state a couple of preliminary results 
is a necessary and su¢cient condition for m t+1 > m t , whereas @St @mt
is necessary but not su¢cient for m t+1 · m t . For t < I and
is a necessary but not su¢cient for
is necessary and su¢cient for m t+1 < m t .
Lemma 3 tells us that the time path of monitoring, and hence compliance and pro…ts, depends crucially on the relationship between monitoring and privatization revenues. If, as seems likely, increased monitoring reduces expected privatization revenues, then monitoring will be lower in all period while there are any utilities remaining to be sold than it will be in periods when all have been privatized. Further, if the marginal e¤ect of monitoring on expected privatization revenues is decreasing in successive periods then the level of monitoring will increase over time. Clearly then explaining @St @mt is the crucial element in deriving the time paths of monitoring, compliance, and pro…ts. Our remaining analysis develops the machinery necessary to sign this term and how it's magnitude changes over time.
Valuing the Expected Revenue from Privatizations.
When a government sells a sequence of I public utilities the value of the expected revenue is just the value of the expected sales prices. The questions are how much is the private sector willing to pay for each utility and how is this valuation determined? We assume that the maximum price the private sector will pay for any given utility is simply equal to the present discounted value of the stream of expected future pro…ts, written V t . For any …rm k privatized at time t this is written
where E p is the expectation of the private sector contingent on information available at time t ¡ 1. Given that the shocks " k t+i are i:i:d: this simpli…es to
The value of S t is then the sum from t+ 1 to I of the private sector valuations V t+1 ; :::V I . In order to calculate this sum we need to make precise how the private sector form their expectations of monitoring.
Private Sector Expectations Formation and the Sales Prices of Utilities.
We assume that agents in the private sector are simple Bayesians 12 . At the beginning of each time period they possess a common prior distribution over the pro…ts that will be realized, and thus implicitly the monitoring that will occur, in this and all subsequent periods 13 . During the period they each gather the same new information which is then used to Bayes update their priors into a posterior distribution. We assume that they cannot directly observe m t or equivalently ¦(m t ), but must make inferences based on observed pro…ts ¦ k t = ¦(m t ) + " k t , which due to the presence of the " k t 's, are a noisy signal of ¦(m t ). We have already made the distributional assumption " k t » N (0; 1) 8k; t, and now make the further assumption that the initial prior describing private sector beliefs about pro…ts is also normal,
t is composed of the sum of two normally distributed independent random variables it too is normally distributed
The updating of expectations occurs as follows; at the beginning of any period, say t; the private sector holds a prior distribution over pro…ts of
Given that beliefs are conditioned on all observations of pro…ts across all previously privatized …rms this implies that in periods t · I when computing this distribution the public sector has t ¡ 1 observations on the …rst …rm privatized, t ¡ 2 on the second, t ¡3 on the third and so on, giving at the end of period t a total number of observations of n(t) = 1 2 t(t+1). In periods t > I the total number of observations are given by n(t) = 1 2 I(I + 1) + (t ¡ I)I where the term (t ¡ I)I re ‡ects that after I there are no further …rms to privatize. 12 Our analysis is motivated by observations of the privatization process in the UK. In this example the British government explicitly restricted the sale of shares to …nancial institutions. The majority of the new equity were purchased by new inexperienced investors. We argue that these inexperienced investors are likely to act as simple Bayesians. 13 There are several ways we could model learning by private agents. They could be learning about some parameter of government preferences and then computing the expected time path of m t , i.e. computing the Bayes-Nash Perfect equilibrium. However, in our opinion, this would be giving agents too much initial information, making them too smart. Recall that in our model when t = 0 private agents have no experience from previous privatizations to draw upon.
The value that the public attach to the …rm to be sold in t is simply
Now let the privatization of the …rm k = t take place and pro…ts ¦ k t , k = 1;:::; t of all the t …rms be revealed. The public then calculates the posterior p.d.f. of pro…ts conditional on the observed pro…ts. These beliefs are then used as the prior distribution of ¦ t+1 . Since both ¦ t and " k t are normally distributed we may use the theory of linear projections to develop updating rules for the mean and variance of the distribution of private sector beliefs, in the appendix we demonstrate that these obey the following system of …rst order non-linear di¤erence equations
It is useful to note a couple of properties of the solution to this system. We may now utilize this result to describe how the publics valuation of utilities evolves over time.
Lagging expression (10) backwards and substituting the result back into the original expression t times gives
where µ j´1 n(j)¾ 2 j +1
. Notice that (11) and the de…nition of µ j´1 n(j)¾ 2
and so on, we may simplify (12) as
:
Hence this expression gives the public's valuation of the utility to be sold at t + 1 in terms of the initial prior distribution ¦ 0 » N (¹ 0 ; ¾ 2 0 ), the exogenous process that governs the evolution of ¾ 2 t , and observations on past pro…ts. From this expression we note that the e¤ect of a change in their level of pro…ts ¦ t on expected pro…ts in a subsequent period t + i may be written
this simply says that changing pro…ts in period t will e¤ect that periods t observations, and that these will appear as data in the updating process i times from t to t + i. The value the public attach to the …rm to be sold in t + 1 is simply
As the government are assumed to know that the public learn in this manner, the expected revenue from the sequence of privatizations at any t < I is then
The Sequence of Privatizations with Strategic
Monitoring.
When the government chooses the level of monitoring for all utilities that have been privatized it considers the e¤ects of monitoring on both economic e¢ciency and expected future sales revenues. It knows that expected future sales revenues equal the public's beliefs about the present discounted value of future pro…ts and it also knows that these beliefs are updated in a Bayesian fashion. Thus the government monitors strategically in the sense that it incorporates the private sector learning mechanism into its optimization problem. It thus maximizes
di¤erentiating w.r.t. m t and m t+1 assuming that the government behaves in a time consistent fashion gives
An analysis of the levels of m t and m t+1 that satisfy these two …rst order conditions allows us to describe the time paths of monitoring and pro…ts, we have
then for all t · I; (i) expected monitoring will be monotonically increasing, and, (ii) expected pro…ts are monotonically decreasing .
Proposition 5 is a very weak requirement for expected monitoring to be monotonically increasing and expected pro…ts monotonically decreasing, if ± = 1=(1 + r) where r is an appropriate interest rate, then for all reasonable values of r the condition ± > is only a su¢cient condition for m t+1 > m t 8t < I the necessary condition (see the appendix for details) is
We can understand this result by examining the government's incentives. The government is motivated by considerations of e¢ciency and revenue. If it monitors more intensely in the current period it will enjoy increased e¢-ciency gains but will loose future expected privatization revenues. Generally the less it discounts the future the less will be it's temptation to monitor intensively. In the early stages of the privatization process there are few utilities privatized so that the e¢ciency gains from monitoring are limited, at the same time the number of utilities that remain to be sold is large so it has an incentive to adopt a low level of monitoring. As the privatization process progresses more utilities are sold thus raising the e¢ciency incentive to monitor more intensively while the decrease in the number of utilities remaining to be sold reduces the revenue incentive to monitor weakly. Expected monitoring thus increases over time.
14 Proposition 6 For t < I, m t < m ¤ t monitoring is below it's constrained socially optimal level in all periods that there remain utilities to be sold. This is a direct consequence of the fact that the socially optimal level of monitoring requires that the government only consider e¢ciency in choosing the optimal level of monitoring. In all periods t < I, the presence of the incentive to raise privatization revenues causes the government to choose monitoring levels below the socially optimal.
Windfall Gains.
Our analysis in the preceding section considers the expected time paths of pro…ts and monitoring. It is interesting to examine the e¤ects of surprises to the pro…t stream de…ned as P j k=1 " k j > 0, from expression (10) we know that ¹ t+1 is increasing in P j k=1 " k j , and further that ¹ t+2 is increasing in ¹ t+1
14
This is exactly consistent with experience as Price [18] notes "At review, the original political considerations for ‡oatation no longer apply and one would expect regulation to be tightened. This has been the case in all industries". and so on. It follows that a windfall gain in period t will raise the public's expectations of future pro…ts in that and all subsequent periods with the implication that the government will receive higher privatization revenues.
3 The Value of a Utility and its Price.
Observation of the sales of several UK utilities indicates that these …rms are often sold at prices well below their true value 15 . Our model of the privatization process allows us to propose an explanation of the phenomena. We have taken as a maintained hypothesis throughout our analysis that the utilities will be run relatively more e¢ciently under private as opposed to public ownership 16 . If a utility is publicly owned and run we denote as V g t its value at time t measured in terms of the present discounted value of expected future pro…ts. If the government were to sell this utility and then regulate it optimally according to its objective function (5) and using (7) the value of the utility may be written
where fm r g t is the sequence of monitoring levels that the government expects to choose given information at time t. Clearly for the sale of the utility to make sense
t is essentially the governments reservation or supply price for the utility. At any price above V g t it is better o¤ selling the utility than retaining public ownership 18 . Now using (15) the value the public attach to a utility and thus 15 See Perotti [17] for a list of discounted sales. 16 Empirical evidence to support this hypothesis may be found in Kikeri et al [11] and Megginson et al [14] who report measured e¢ciency gains from privatizations. 17 Were this not the case the government could achieve its revenue rasing objective by selling bonds and then use the stream of returns from the utility to service the debt. 18 It is possible that in some analyses the government might have an incentive to strategically refuse to sell a utility in an attempt to manipulate the publics beliefs about it's value.
the total price that they will be willing to pay for the utility to be sold in period t is given by
this is the demand price for the utility. We now have
t the government will choose to sell the utility despite the fact that it is being sold at a discount. (ii) If V This proposition summarizes the argument presented above. The government will always be willing to sell a utility when the public are prepared to pay more than the reservation price. Whether the utility sells at a discount or premium depends on whether V Note that this discussion hinges faily crucially on the way in which we have assumed the private sector form their expectations ,and have speci…ed the governments objective function. These ensure that there is no way that the government may strategically delay the sale of a utility in the hope of V p increasing.
Private Information about Government
Preferences.
Our preceding analysis explains several of the features of a sequence of utility privatizations by assuming that the costs of monitoring are private information. We can obtain almost identical results by assuming that monitoring is observable but the relative weights attached to e¢ciency and revenues in government preferences are private information known only by the government itself. Suppose that we modify (5) such that government preferences may be rewritten as
where ® is private information to the government. With this speci…cation the government's optimization problem is almost identical to that investigated in section 2.3. The optimization problem of the privatized utilities and the private sector expectations formation mechanisms will be exactly as before. We can conclude immediately that the properties of the time paths will be as described above the only di¤erences being quantitative. We can show m t to be an increasing function of ® for all t < I and that ® T 1 ) m ® t T m t where m ® t is the optimal monitoring level generated if (23) replaces (17) as the description of government preferences.
An Illustration: Water Privatization in the United Kingdom
Our theoretical model predicts that over time the level of e¤ective regulation faced by privatized utilities will increase while their pro…ts will decline. This general prediction is consistent with evidence from the United Kingdom water utility which was privatized late in 1989. This privatization was one of several which occurred in the 1980's and early 1990's. As with other privatized utilities, water companies are subject to a regulated price regime and, in addition, are required to satisfy European Community standards concerning the quality of water provided and treated (Helm and Rajah [10] ). But companies have often been accused of making excessive pro…ts, and of wasting water by permitting rates of leakage which are considerably higher than comparable countries, such as France. Matters came to a head in the summer of 1995, when Yorkshire water, faced by below-average rainfall, was shipping water into the area by road tanker at a cost of £3 million per week, at the same time as it reported water leakage rates of over 30% (Ofwat [16] ). Yet pre-tax pro…ts of Yorkshire Water were expected to increase by 48% in 1995 (Financial Times 30th November 1995). The water regulator, OFWAT, was quoted by the Financial Times (December 1st, 1995) as saying that, since privatization, a number of water companies had "reneged on promises made to carry out repairs to leaky mains and [to keep] cash earmarked for work". The traditional defences of the water industry to the charge of excess wastage of water have been to contest reported leakage rates and blame users of excess usage and leaking appliances. Water leakage rates unlike, say, water quality standards are hard to monitor, not least by consumers (the di¢culty is aggravated because only few domestic houses are metered and the rest are charged a …xed rate). The suspicion however remains that water companies have capped investment levels in order to pay out dividends, while diverting investment to the more easily-monitored attainment of water quality and e-uent treatment standards. Indeed, water companies are currently allowed to prevent leakage only insofar as it is economically reasonable. 20 This is about to change. In 1995 OFWAT signalled that it intended to widen the mandatory scheme which allows customers to claim compensation from restricted water usage in the event of water restrictions (Financial Times 2 September 95) and to order mandatory repairs to water mains to be carried out from the current budget of companies (Financial Times 1 December 95). And in 1996, it announced tougher future price caps and the intention of introducing mandatory leakage prevention targets (OFWAT [16] ).
The picture painted here is what we would expect. When the water utility was privatized several key utilities remained in public hands but were scheduled for privatization. Initially the water utility faced little e¤ective regulation and enjoyed signi…cant pro…ts. However, as the number of other 20 Leakage controls should be increased until the incremental (marginal) leakage prevention costs costs are in balance with alternative water provision methods such as resource development, see Ofwat (1996) . utilities remaining to be sold has decreased the regulatory regime has tightened.
Conclusion.
In this analysis we have sought to understand some of the phenomena associated with the privatization of public utilities. We argue that the crucial characteristic that explains many of the observed events is that there is an information asymmetry between the government and public over the cost of monitoring a …rm's compliance to the post privatization regulatory regime. The government knows the costs of monitoring, but the public can only make inferences based on a noisy signal, observed pro…ts. The government, aware of how the public update their beliefs about the monitoring costs, act strategically in choosing the level of monitoring for the utilities that are already privatized. The motivation for this behavior is supplied by the assumption that the government's objective function contains both a revenue and e¢-ciency objective. Lower monitoring in the early stages of the privatization process causes the public to upwardly revise their expectations of future profits and hence the price that they are willing to pay for equity in future share ‡otations. Our theory predicts that expected monitoring levels will typically rise along the time path of privatizations with the implication that pro…ts will be initially high but then fall with this pattern re ‡ected in the prices of successive utility sales. This is what "typically" happens, although deviations from this path can occur if there are signi…cant "windfall" gains or losses, i.e. shocks to pro…ts.
While our stylized analysis appears to be able to explain some of the features of observed privatization process' there are several issues that is currently too simple to address. We have assumed that all utilities are homogeneous, and thus the sequence in which they are privatized is irrelevant. Were …rms heterogeneous, with an idiosyncratic component to the cost of monitoring, then perhaps the sequence of privatizations might be explained by the governments desire to strategically manipulate the publics beliefs. Further, we have also not modelled the use to which the government puts the privatization revenues. Some of these are clearly distributed to the public via the discounts o¤ered on the initial equity ‡otations.. This is an interesting issue in it's own right, and one we believe that must be incorporated in any assessment of the desirability of privatization. 
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2.
Firm expected pro…ts may be written ¦ t (m t )´P (C(m t )) ¡ T (C(m t ); m t ), di¤erentiating this expression w.r.t. m t yields @¦t @mt
by the …rst order condition from the …rms optimization problem, (2) , this reduces to @¦t @mt = ¡T mt < 0. Di¤erentiating again w.r.t. m t yields This follows immediately by noting from (6) that the governments optimization problem for t¸I to that in the single …rm case that generates m
when there are equalities apply part (i) of this proof, when there are inequalities note that in footnote (8) we prove F 00 (m t ) < 0; so if F 0 (m the we know from (6) and 
which is a necessary but not su¢cient condition for
for which a necessary and su¢cient condition is
A.4 Derivation of the updating rules for private sector beliefs.
Following Hamilton [7] pp 100-102 we know that if Y 1 is an (n 1 £1) vector of normally distributed random variables with mean ¹ 1 , and Y 2 is an (n 2 £ 1) vector of normally distributed random variables with mean ¹ 2 , where the variance covariance matrix is given by
In our problem Y 1 = (¦ 1 ; :::; ¦ n(t) ), Y 2 = (¦ 1 ; :::; ¦ n(t) ), -11 is an (n(t)£n(t)) covariance matrix of the observations ¦ 1 ; :::; ¦ n(t) , -12 is an (1 £ n(t)) covariance matrix between the observations ¦ 1 ; :::; ¦ n(t) and the variable ¦ t , -21 is an (n(t) £ 1) covariance matrix between the variable ¦ t and the observations ¦ 1 ; :::; ¦ n(t) , -22 is the variance of ¦ t denoted ¾ To ease the calculations to follow we …rst compute -11 it's inverse -
¡1
11 , -12 , -21 , and -22 .
1. -11 and -
11 , where -11 is the variance covariance matrix of observations (¦ 1 ; :::; ¦ n(t) ):
The covariance is de…ned as to invert this matrix note …rst that it may be rewritten
where I is an (n(t) £ n(t)) identity matrix, and H is an (n(t) £ n(t)) matrix with each element unity. To …nd -
11 apply the method of undetermined coe¢cients, guess
using H 2 = n(t)H it follows that the above holds if b = 1 and (a¾ into the original guess gives the inverse which is an (n(t) £ n(t)) matrix.
2 -12 is an (1£n(t)) covariance matrix between the observations ¦ 1 ; :::; ¦ n(t) and the variable ¦ t , the covariance is de…ned by
is an (n(t) £ 1) covariance matrix between the variable ¦ t and the observations ¦ 1 ; :::; ¦ n(t) , this is clearly just the transpose of -12 .
4 -22 is the variance of ¦ t denoted ¾ 2 t .
We may now compute the updating rules for the mean and variance. Consider …rst the mean, we have
where ¦ n(t) ¡ ¹ t is an (n(t) £ 1) vector of data expressed as deviations from the current mean. Hence 
computing the matrix multiplication yields
gathering terms this yields
which is equation (10) . Next consider the variance, we have
11 -12 which may be written carrying out the matrix multiplication yields
simple algebra now reduces this expression to
A.5 Proof of Lemma 4.
Part (i) In the steady state ¾ 2 t = 0: Follows immediately from noting that , and that for n(t) > 1 (and n(t) is integer valued) then n(t)¾
A.6 Proof of Proposition 5.
then for all t · I monitoring will be monotonically increasing.
First note that @St @mt´@ St @¦t @¦t @mt ; and that from Lemma 2 @¦t @mt = ¡T mt < 0 which is a negative constant. Now since F 00 (m t ) < 0 we have
we thus need to examine the relationship between @St @¦t and @St+1 @¦t+1
:
We know from (15) 
@¦ t ¶ + :::
@¦ t+1 ¶ + :::
From ( 
3t ¶ µ @¹ t+3
3t ¶ µ @¹ t+3 @¦ t ¶ + ::
3t ¶ µ @¹ t+3 @¦ t ¶ + :::
(I ¡ t)t ¶ µ @¹ I @¦ t ¶ this may be rewritten as
@¦ t ¶ using (14) again provides
! substituting this into the condition (24) above yields
) m t S m t+1 (28) now using (14) again in (26) we may reexpress
in terms of the variances as
1 ¡ ± ¶ 2(t + 1)¾ 2 t+3 + :::
inserting this expression into (27) allows the condition to be written as
) m t S m t+1 multiplying both sides by t(1 ¡ ±) reduces the expression to
A.7 Proof of Proposition 6.
In the preceding proof we demonstrated @St @mt´@ St @¦ t @¦t @mt < 0 the proof now follows immediately from lemma 3.
